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an answer to global climate change? 
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New Zealand emissions trading scheme 
New Zealand’s main policy instrument to 
achieve climate change goals and obligations is 
the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• “…providing a way for the New Zealand economy to meet 
our Kyoto obligations at the least possible cost…”  
• “…to position our economy for probably deeper emission 
obligations in the future…” 
• “…to influence near-term long-lived investment decisions 
through adopting the international market price for 
emission units…” 
Source: www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions/net-position/index.html. Accessed 30 May 2010.  
Article 3.3 
• Annex I Parties must report emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of GHGs resulting from 
LULUCF activities, in accordance with Article 3, 
paragraphs 3 and 4. Under Article 3.3 of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Parties decided that net changes 
in GHG emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks through direct human-induced LULUCF 
activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation 
and deforestation that occurred since 1990, can 
be used to meet Parties’ emission reduction 
commitments.  
Source: http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4129.php 
New Zealand’s commitment under Kyoto 
Source: Ministry for the Environment, 2014 
Description of the New Zealand 
emissions trading scheme 
• Implemented in 2008 with forestry the first sector enlisted 
• Other sectors entered mid-2010 
• Cap and trade scheme (some have criticised it for having no explicit 
cap) 
• Based on the NZU, a local unit, limited ability to trade with 
international units. But local emitters can also surrender 
international units to meet emissions commitments  
• An all-sectors ETS in principle, but in practice….. 
– NZs largest emitter (agriculture) is not required to participate 
– Energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries are issued credits to 
cover their emissions 
– Half obligation for participating emitting sectors 
– Price ceiling of $25/tonne 
– Government is developing an auctioning system to allow it to introduce 
additional credits to the market 
ETS – timing of entry of emitting sectors 
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Response of the emitting sectors 
 
Emissions by sector 
Source: Ministry for the Environment, 2014 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Energy 34.6 31.7 31.6 31.2 32.1 161.29 
Industrial processes 4.1 4.2 4.5 5.3 5.3 23.41 
Solvents 0 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.15 
Waste 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 18.63 
Agriculture 33.2 33.4 33.6 34.2 35 169.32 
Forestry 
Net Removals -14.2 -12.3 -14.4 -15.5 -15.1 -71.6 
Deforestation 3.2 5.6 4.1 3.4 4 20.2 
Gross removals -17.4 -18 -18.5 -18.8 -19.1 -91.8 
Total 61.5 60.8 59.1 58.9 60.9 301.2 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/reporting-greenhouse-gas-emissions/nzs-net-position-under-kyoto-protocol/latest 
(Compared with 
Assigned Amount of 
302.1 million AAUs) 
• Some large 
emitters did deals 
directly with land 
owners with 
existing post-1989 
forest, or 
landowners with 
land that could be 
planted 
• Large emitters 
bought credits 
“forward” to meet 
future obligations 
at a known price 
• Allowed forest 
owners to fix price 
for credits in future 
 
NZ Farmers Weekly March 8, 2010 
Early 
response 
from emitters 
Buying NZUs forward 
2010 & 2011 Emissions and surrenders 
Source: EPA, 2014 
How participants in the ETS 
have met their surrender 
obligations 
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Response of the forestry sector 
 
Source: EPA (2014) 
Net change in commercial forest area 
Source: EPA (2014) 
Survey of deforestation intentions 
(thousand hectares) 
Source: Manley (2013) 
Impact of the ETS on forestry 
profitability 
 
Impact of the ETS 
• “…Owners of pre-1990 forest land that exceeds 50 ha 
and any ETS participants occupying post-1989 forest 
land that enters the ETS, effectively have a contract 
with the Crown to maintain forest or surrender 
carbon units. This requirement potentially impose a 
financial impost on any owner of such land in the 
event that the owner wishes to change the land 
use…” 
Source: Armstrong et al., 2011 
A forest owner who enters the ETS earns 
NZUs based on sequestration of CO2e 
If a single age-class 
forest owner 
participates in the ETS 
the cash flows from the 
sale of NZUs (carbon 
credits) follow this 
pattern. Incremental 
carbon earns credits 
and harvesting 
generates obligations 
to surrender carbon, 
driven by the change in 
carbon stock  
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time since entering ETS (years) 
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radiata pine 
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Effect of ETS on forestry profitability 
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Source: Bloomberg, M. MAF ETS Workshops, June 2010 
Rules of ETS 
You are only liable for 
carbon that you have 
previously earned. This 
is the “afforestation 
reforestation debit 
credit (ARDC) rule” 
otherwise known as 
the “fast forest fix”. 
This has been retained 
in the NZ ETS, but 
dropped in 
international climate 
change negotiations  
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This rule means that the earnings from entering an existing forest 
into the ETS are different to entering a new forest into the ETS 
Enter normal forest into ETS 
Carbon cash flows decline as 
carbon liabilities increase each 
year. Eventually, liabilities 
equal annual earnings, and 
there is no further benefit to 
participation in the ETS. 
Compliance costs actually 
provide a small dis-benefit 
The afforestation reforestation debit 
credit (ARDC) rule has been retained 
in the NZ ETS (although removed 
during the Durban negotiations for 
the Kyoto replacement).  
Source: Carbon Daily 18/03/2014 
Market price, 
NZ units 
Source: Carbon Daily 27/05/2015 https://www.commtrade.co.nz/ 
What determines the impact of ETS on 
profitability? 
– Structure of forest 
– Time since entering the ETS 
– Price of NZUs 
– Risk appetite of grower 
• Proportion of credits surrendered 
• Species and silviculture 
Sources of revenue, City Forests Ltd 
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New Zealand carbon credits Operating surplus before tax
from City Forests Annual Report 2014 
Summary: $$ from the ETS 
• A forest that is supplying timber products will tend towards a normal forest. 
This type of forest has only an initial financial benefit from participation in 
the ETS. 
• If you have a single age-class forest, and are risk averse, you might only 
claim “safer carbon”. This is also an initial financial benefit only which is not 
repeated in second and subsequent rotations 
• If you have a single age class forest and you trade NZUs right through each 
rotation you are also making a return on the time value of credits earned 
above the safer carbon level.  
• Can manage carbon liability risk by growing a higher-value timber crop. This 
will also tend to reduce carbon returns.  
• Carbon returns will always be dependent on the age of the forest when 
entering the scheme. Entering a newly planted forest maximises returns 
• There is a “slow start” to cashflow generation – don’t get much from the 
first three years after planting 
• While the NZ ETS entails payment for an environmental service (the 
sequestration of carbon) it also encumbers forestry land with a contingency 
liability with an uncertain value 
 
Government policy direction 
 
The government is finalising its position 
for the next round of negotiations… 
• The rules that will apply on forests and land-use change. Given the 
significance of the land sector to New Zealand, these rules are particularly 
important to us as they can considerably affect the cost of our target.  
• Technology. Uncertainties surrounding future technology, particularly in 
agriculture, will affect our ability to transition to a lower-carbon future. 
While we are starting to see promising opportunities, their commercial 
viability is not yet clear.  
• Access to international carbon markets. It is not clear if the agreement will 
recognise the use of markets to meet contributions, and how they will 
operate. Given we have fewer low-cost options to reduce domestic 
emissions, emissions reductions overseas have been crucial to meeting 
our current targets.  
• The future international carbon price that will affect the cost of our target.  
 Source: Ministry for the Environment, 2015 
Why the government likes international credits 
Credits acquired at a value of 37 cents per tonne 
What are the Kyoto rules for carry-over of 
units between commitment periods? 
 • AAUs can be carried over without limitation. 
• CERs and ERUs converted from AAUs may be carried over, 
up to a limit of 2.5% of New Zealand’s assigned amount for 
each of these two units. The total combined carry-over is 
not allowed to exceed 5% of the initial assigned amount of 
Kyoto units. Based on New Zealand’s initial assigned 
amount of Kyoto units, this equates to approximately 15 
million units: 7.5m CERs and 7.5m ERUs respectively. Kyoto 
rules specify that any CERs and ERUs above this 2.5% 
threshold are cancelled. 
• RMUs, tCERs and ICERs and ERUs from LULUCF projects 
may not be carried over. 
 
http://www.eur.govt.nz/how-to/guides-hmtl/guide-to-kyoto-units-and-rules 
Accessed 29/05/2015 2.36 pm 
Net position as at April 2015 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/climate-change/reporting-greenhouse-gas-emissions/nzs-net-position-under-kyoto-protocol/latest 
 
Source: Scrimgeour and Denne, 2008 
Strategic role of forests 
 
Is carbon sequestration through new 
forest establishment an answer to 
global climate change? 
 • In the period to 2050 afforestation and other 
technologies that rely on biological systems – 
have been found to be the only potentially 
significant contributors to reducing carbon 
emissions 
• the numbers for forestry are significantly more 
conservative than what can be achieved with fast 
growing plantations 
• A viable way of providing time to implement 
measures to move to a low carbon economy 
NETS, or “negative emissions 
technologies” 
NETs Description Storage 
medium 
Estimated 
cost 
Sequestration 
potential 
2020-2050 
Afforestation Planting forests or 
managing to enhance 
uptake 
Biomass and 
soil carbon 
$20-$100 / t 
CO2e 
30 Gt CO2 
Agricultural 
land 
management 
Changing land 
management practices to 
increase organic carbon in 
soils 
Soil organic 
carbon 
Cost negative 
to $100/tCO2e 
39 Gt CO2 
 
Biochar Converting biomass 
through pyrolysis, to a 
stable product that is 
added to soil 
Stable char 
products in 
soils 
$0-$135 / t 
CO2e 
33 Gt CO2 
Bioenergy with 
carbon capture 
and storage 
Capturing and storing 
carbon emitted from 
biomass combustion or 
conversion 
Supercritical 
CO2 in 
geological 
storage 
$45 - $250 / t 
CO2e 
15 Gt CO2 
 
Source: Caldecott et al. (2015) 
What is the “cost of production” in NZ? 
• Using the average 
Afforestation Grant of 
$1868/ha, the breakeven 
carbon price (to make 
exactly 7% on the 
investment) is an average 
price of $18/tonne 
• Use of a higher discount 
rate would increase the 
breakeven value 
• If carbon yields were 
conservative the 
breakeven carbon price 
would be lower 
 
 
Age 
Carbon 
increment 
(tonnes 
CO2e) 
1 0.4 
2 1.6 
3 4 
4 18 
5 27 
6 33 
7 34 
8 25 
9 12 
10 14 
The 
Afforestation 
Grant Scheme 
provided 
funds to 
establish new 
forest, and 
means for the 
government to 
acquire the 
rights to the 
carbon from 
the first ten 
years of 
growth of that 
forest.  
Conclusion 
 
Conclusions  
– impacts on forestry profitability 
• Carbon market prices tend to rise and fall with the local and global economy. This may not 
align with GHG commitments or aspirations of a particular country. 
• Carbon prices are currently too low in New Zealand to encourage new forestry planting, 
and the rapid decline in carbon prices may have reduced confidence in the market.  
• There is inherently a slow start to earnings for new forests, so need to have confidence in 
the long term viability of the market. 
• Allowing international credits to be used to meet emissions obligations under the NZ ETS 
has reduced the demand for forestry NZUs to nearly zero 
• The ETS has rendered pre-1990 forests “2nd class forests”. There is an incentive for owners 
of these forests to change land use while carbon prices are very low, even if they re-forest 
later. 
• Carbon liabilities reduce the liquidity of forest land as an asset class 
• Based on New Zealand’s experience to date, an emissions trading scheme is not the answer 
either a profitable forestry sector, or a low carbon future 
• The generally transitory nature of the economic benefits of the ETS to the forestry sector  
are inherent in the design of the scheme. 
 
 
An appropriate role for forestry 
• A profitable and expanding forestry sector will 
reduce net emissions up to a point in time. 
• From then on, a profitable forestry sector will 
contribute by maintaining carbon sinks, the 
industry will derive most of its energy 
requirements from sustainable sources (that is, 
wood waste), and a number of forestry 
products (sawn timber, roundwood and wood 
based panels) contribute to longer term carbon 
storage 
3 main conclusions 
• While forests planted in the 1990s in New Zealand have played a significant 
role in NZ meeting its Kyoto commitments, the NZ ETS has not stimulated 
planting of new forests, for a number of reasons, including 
– price uncertainty increasing investment risk 
– Long term carbon liabilities 
– financial benefits are finite (around 20 years) for most forest owners 
• Government’s implementation of the ETS has  focused largely on the 
objective of meeting NZ’s Kyoto objectives at minimum cost 
– The NZ ETS has been very effective at attractinv international credits that the 
government can use to offset the longer term liabilities inherent in using RMUs 
(earned from planted forest carbon sequestration) to meet current 
commitments 
• Planting new forest is the most feasible and cost-effective technology for 
removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and could be implemented 
on a significant scale. 
– But the current implementation of government policy is not effective at 
mobilising this capability   
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